International Cooperation for the Management of the Nile River
Keynote Speech - 10th Anniversary of ENTRO Building successful transboundary river basin institutions
By Olivier Cogels, Former CEO of the Mekong River CommissionAddis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 October 2012
Put online on 17 juin 2020
Introduction
Excellences, Honourable Ministers, Parliamentarians, Ambassadors, Executive Directors of the Nile Centres, Officer in Charge of ENTRO, Representatives of Development Partners and of Civil Society, dear friends of the Nile. It's really a great honour and pleasure to be invited to participate with you in this important event, one more milestone in the long and fabulous history of this majestic river, mother of civilisations. Congratulations!
An anniversary is often a privileged moment to invite family and friends to think about all what has been achieved, the good and the bad, but it's even more an opportunity to dream and exchange views about the future. Allow me thus to share with you some of my ideas about the future of transboundary river basin cooperation. I would like to address with you two key questions based on my own experience in various parts of the world:
But first allow me to briefly set the scene of the macro-economic context. Macro-economic context Since I was born, the world population has almost tripled. In the next 30 years, the African population will still double. In the developing world, poverty alleviation and economic growth will remain the top priorities for decades. The needs for development are gigantic and the challenges are monumental. In Africa, in the next 30 years, the need for energy will grow by a factor of 4 or 5, The investment needs in the hydropower sector alone in Africa is estimated at $US 20 to 25 billion/year. Food requirements will more than double, while renewable water resources per capita will be reduced by half. More countries will face severe water scarcity and will not be able to achieve food self-sufficiency. Countries will thus have to rely more and more on food trade as well as on significant increase of productivity of rain fed agriculture. And while Africa has the lowest water storage capacity per capita, the risks of severe droughts and floods will dramatically increase if global warming continues. Fortunately, huge potentials are still untapped. But with increased pressure on the resources, environmental protection will also become more and more important in the political agendas. In Africa less than 10% of the hydropower potential is exploited. Tens of millions of hectares of land can still be put under irrigation in the basins where the natural flow of the river is not yet intensively used, such as the Congo and the Zambezi, but which is unfortunately not the case any more for the Nile. Emerging economical giants are changing the global economical and geopolitical landscape. Besides these giants, each individual country alone represents less and less on the world chessboard. The globalisation of the economy increases competition but offers also new opportunities for those who stick together with their neighbors. To create alliances, to develop joint ventures, to develop commercial exchanges, to increase mobility of people and goods, and to optimize the development and management of their natural resources. There is an increasing need of pooling resources together and of reducing political risks in order to attract international investment in financing large-scale infrastructure with a regional dimension. Countries have no other choice any more than to develop regional economic cooperation and integration.. The picture of international development aid is also changing drastically. In the last 10 years, new players have appeared on the stage. China alone contributed more to hydropower development in Africa than the total aid provided by all conventional multilateral organizations. Need for cooperation on the management of international rivers This quick review of the global and African macro-economic context brings me to the first question: "Why would governments want to cooperate on the management of international rivers. What are the benefits - what are the risks?" I will never forget the comment of the Council Chairman of the Mekong River Commission in the beginning of my mandate in 2004. He said to me, as a friendly provocation: "Olivier, why do we need to cooperate if there is nothing to cooperate on?". Let me try to give some answers to this simple but challenging question. First of all, it's obvious that the sustainable exploitation of the water resources potential of a large river system, for energy, food, transport, tourism, may contribute substantially to socio-economic development and increase of GDP. But in Africa, a reality is that 80 % of the water resources are "transboundary" in nature, which means that they are shared by at least two countries. And there is also a physical reality that cannot be ignored: because of topography and climate, hydropower generation is often more profitable when developed upstream, in cascades of hydropower dams where water can be re-used several times before being evaporated downstream in irrigation schemes. Integrated planning of irrigation and hydropower developments at the basin or sub basin scale is thus obviously more optimal and more cost-effective. And in a later stage, when tens of large multi-purpose dams and water diversions are in operation in one river system, uncoordinated operations can only lead to catastrophes and to poor economical efficiencies. That's how big countries such as China, the USA, Brazil, India, Australia, try to optimize their investments and operations at the basin scale. But in transboundary river basins, such optimal planning of investments and operations cannot be achieved without strong inter-governmental cooperation based on appropriate agreements. So, the need for joint investment planning in a first stage, and for joint operation of multiple hydraulic structures in a later stage, may generate much more economical return than individual planning and operation. The difference may count in hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars per year. In Africa, there are still opportunities to jointly build dams on rivers which constitute the border between two countries. And for business purposes alone, there are also opportunities for creating joint ventures between neighbouring countries for the building and the operation of dams in one of the countries. In the Mekong Basin, Thai public companies are investing in hydropower development in Laos, with the aim of selling electricity to Thailand. And Vietnam has plans to build hydropower dams in Cambodia. Besides hydropower, there are also several other specific issues, which obviously can be better addressed in cooperation with the neighbours. I already mentioned that food security in Africa will rely more and more on food trade. Reducing flood risks needs early warning systems and flood protection measures which can only be designed and implemented across borders. Cross-border navigation is another relevant case. On the Mekong River, it's the Mekong River Commission who installed the light buoys and who facilitated the negotiations to allow night navigation between Vietnam and Cambodia. Managing the risks of large pollutions due to industrial or shipping accidents on a shared river is one more concrete example. Supporting upstream countries to fight against soil erosion to reduce siltation and to reduce the costs of canal cleaning in downstream countries is another example. This is known as the concept of "payment for watershed services". So there are plenty of excellent reasons to develop cooperation between countries sharing a common river. Now what about the risk of non- cooperation, of continuing "business as usual"? In the context of growing needs for resources, lack of cooperation among riparian countries sharing an international river may lead to grave political crises. This is not just a speculation. Such crises exist: there are several examples of dramatic floods caused in downstream countries by uncoordinated dam releases in upstream countries. In 2004, I have been invited by the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Thai parliament in Bangkok to appease an political tension between Thailand and China. Thai farmers were urging the Thai Government to send a complain to the Chinese Government about impacts of the cascade of dams in China. One was talking about the "Mekong Crisis". Seen the macro-economic context, it makes no doubt to me that without constructive cooperation to address concrete water related issues, the economic, environmental, and thus political risks can only increase dramatically and very quickly. In the case of the Nile, a river under such an huge and increasing stress, uncoordinated investments may only lead to a political "crash". Cooperation mechanisms do not cost a lot, but non-cooperation may lead to mistrust, to severe conflicts, to losses of billions of dollars, to obstacles to trade, and to losses of human lives. How to build successful transboundary river basin institutions So, let us assume that governments may well be convinced by the need for cooperation on the management of transboundary rivers. But that doesn't mean that they are motivated to create and financially support substantially the development and operation of River Basin and Sub-basin organizations. Regional institutions are rarely the "cherished child" of governments. Look at the difficulties encountered in Europe in convincing the population about the usefulness and efficiency of the European institutions and treaties. The question is not so much 'Why " to cooperate, but the question is more "What for" and "How". What should be the role and mandate of a River Basin Organization (RBO)? What should be the scope and content of an international agreement to regulate, govern or facilitate cooperative transboundary river basin management. Let's make a brief diagnosis and look at the difficulties without beating the bush, or "sans langue de bois" as one says in French. Let's face it frankly: all around the world, I can find governments who are disappointed by the orientations and the performances of their basin organizations and who are therefore reluctant to increase their financial contribution. Governments sometimes look at RBOs rather weirdly and express their impatience to see more concrete and tangible on-the-ground investments, which would be able to boost regional cooperation and economic development. I often hear the following complains in the mouth of top-politicians: "lack of tangible outputs for the direct benefit of the people, endless processes, too much paper and too many strategies, lack of visibility, too much donor-driveness, too much emphasis on environment, too much dispersion., lack of clarity, lack of focus". Too many actors also want to influence the directions and priorities of transboundary cooperative organizations. And when we look at the motivations of a large part of the donor community, joint investment planning is often drowned in a pond of many other functions and concepts. With such an approach, the risk exist that RBOs get stuck in an endless process of capacity building, data collection, knowledge generation, environmental assessment, awareness building, gender mainstreaming, stakeholder involvement, climate change adaptation, etc. before focusing their efforts on the preparation and implementation of a concrete joint investment program. And we may like it or not, but with exaggerated emphasis put on the environmental aspects, governments will more and more, and individually, turn their eyes to the new players in the game: China, India, Brazil, Korea. In my views, the main problem of many basin organizations is that their mandate is too broad and nebulous, not enough concentrated on tangible outputs with immediate and tangible benefits for the basin populations. RBOs tend to get trapped in a vicious circle. The delays in delivering tangible results generate impatience and lack of confidence from their governments, reducing their motivation for more financial support, and thus delaying the process even more. This was the message given to me by the governments of the 4 member countries of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) when I entered in office in 2004. We thus tried together to rectify the policy orientation and strategic direction of the organization. But we immediately faced a very negative reaction of an important part of the donor community. The Mekong governments wanted the organization to be a facilitator of joint investments, while the key donors wanted the MRC to remain only a knowledge broker, with strong emphasis on environmental impacts of national investments. During the council meeting in December 2005 a crisis broke out between the member countries on the one hand and the donor community on the other, led by the Denmark. The donors made the following statement: “Donors are concerned about the direction towards increased emphasis on MRC becoming an organization that drives investments. In our view the MRC should maintain and strengthen its unique role as a knowledge based river basin organization ....... the investment facilitation role should be limited to screening of projects based on MRC's knowledge and expertise and not undertake pre-feasibility studies.…”. This directive statement was signed by 19 donors. The country delegations reacted heavily during the meeting. One of the country representatives stood up and said: "We don't want the MRC to be NATO, No Action, Talk Only". But at the end, nothing fundamentally changed, as donors, pulling the purse strings, still pay 85 % of MRC's budget. The preparation of a joint investment program is still considered only as one of the medium and long-term options. This has also negative consequences on the cooperation with China, which is not yet a member of the MRC. In June 2005, I was officially invited by China to talk about opportunities for increased cooperation. It appeared that China was open to participate in a joint investment program, but that the main obstacle was the donor-driven nature and lack of country ownership of the institution. Still today, China prefers to cooperate through bilateral arrangements and through more economically driven inter-governmental cooperation frameworks in the Mekong region. Suggested approach What could be a more effective approach and what are the traps to avoid in order to build successful Transboundary River Basin Institutions? To address this I would need more time, but at least I can try to draw some lessons from my own experience and suggest a possible approach on the basis of some key principles. But as there is no standard model for transboundary river basin institutions, the ideas presented here should be nuanced and adapted to the historical, geopolitical, economical, geographical, and hydrological specificities of each river basin. The first principle is that the institution must be "country-owned" and "country-driven". Country-ownership of the strategy and of the management of the institution is fundamental. But country-ownership can only exist if governments are convinced by the its strategic orientation and efficiency. We will come back to the mission later on. A second principle is that the approach has to continuously remain "issue-based". As discussed before, the range of issues and challenges in a basin is very broad. Too broad for a small institution. One say in French: "qui trop embrasse, mal etreint", which can somehow be translated in English by: 'grasp all, lose all.' In other words, one should limit the scope to those cooperation areas which obviously need a basin or sub-basin approach and for which governments are strongly convinced that cooperation may offer substantial benefits and reduce risks. A third principle is that the cooperation must remain "objective oriented". The objective should be to deliver concrete, tangible, and visible results within a reasonable timeframe. To help the member countries to go in a clear direction and to reach a given point in a given time. The direction, the role, the purpose, the "core business", of a Transboundary River Basin Institution must be clear, simply stated, convincing and straightforward. It has to be understood by everyone, and above all by the media and the population. In the developed world, the main objective may be environmental protection. This is understandable. But in most large rivers in the developing world, the driving force of cooperation will remain for many years the need for more optimal, more productive, more profitable, more cost-effective and sustainable coordinated investment to harness the water resources of a river, to increase the water, food, and energy security and to protect the people. With such a purpose - clearly stated - a transboundary river basin institution should have the ambition to be a leader in sustainable economic development in its region. Therefore one needs of course data, information, knowledge, models, monitoring systems, planning capacity, public participation, and more. But all this should not be seen as a purpose in itself. These are only useful means to reach an objective, not an objective in itself. A car may have a nice body, a strong frame, comfortable seats, good tires, but without an engine it will not go very far. In the late fifties the clearly stated objective of jointly building and operating the Kariba dam, one of the largest dams in the world, has laid the foundation of the creation of the Zambezi River Authority between Zambia and Zimbabwe. More recently, after the colonial times, it has been the willingness to build and operate jointly the Manantali and the Diama dam on the Senegal River, which has laid the foundation of the cooperation agreement between the 4 riparian countries and the basis of the creation of the "OMVS". Look at the clear Vision of the Zambezi River Authority: "To be the premier organ for harnessing and managing the Zambezi waters for economic and social development". And to its mission: "satisfying all our stakeholders through purposefully and sustainably exploiting the natural advantages offered by the Zambezi River" Facilitating joint investment should be clearly seen from outside as being the motor of the car, not only one of the passengers. Another principle is that the organization needs to have one clear, well-structured, and coherent program, to implement one clear "country-owned" strategy to reach the objective. To prepare and facilitate the negotiation and then the implementation of such a joint investment program we need a strong institution. That becomes its "reason to be". I use here the term "investment program" in its broad sense: it should be a well-balanced combination of hard and soft investments, including environment protection measures, providing benefits for all member states. An example is the investment program signed in 2008 by the 9 Heads of States of the Niger Basin Authority. As said before already, I have seen too many cases where an RBO implements a poorly structured and nebulous mix of overlapping programs and projects. Haziness, nebulousness in defining the organization and its activities is a killing factor. The rule should be: "one organization, one objective, one strategy and one program to reach the common objective". Another important principle is the principle of subsidiarity. Whatever countries can do, let it be done by them. And let the capacity be built first at country level before being built at regional level. In the field of data collection, knowledge generation, and research, the role of an RBO should be limited to harmonization, coordination, and synthesizing. Another principle is the adoption of a stepwise and flexible approach. Sometimes agreements should not be too complex and constraining before engaging in concrete cooperation. The Mekong Agreement signed in 1995 is rather general and not very binding. Over the years, MRC facilitated the negotiation of more precise rules and procedures for which an agreement could not be found in 1995. At that time, it was for example not possible to agree on precise rules for the maintenance of flows on the river mainstream. Procedures have only been approved 11 years later and concrete figures for acceptable flows to be maintained at specific locations are yet to be defined and agreed upon. Sometimes it may also be more convenient to start the cooperation with only one joint investment project or set of projects, and to build a common institution for that purpose only. In the case of the building of a large dam in an upstream country, which is often controversial, win-win cooperation with downstream countries for the financing, the construction and the operation of the dam may considerable reduce the risks as well as generate substantial benefits for all. Rather to become a source of tension, it may become an opportunity for focused and constructive cooperation. And when more trust is there, when the institution has proven it's efficiency and effectiveness, the cooperation may be further extended and enriched to address jointly other investment opportunities and development challenges. Conclusion Without strong win-win cooperation for optimal use and management of shared water resources, the world in general and Africa in particular, will face highly unefficient water use and increasing risks of competition and conflicts. The management of any large international river system needs a well-balanced but focused cooperation, based on shared investments and shared benefits, recognizing the complementarities and priority needs of all the parties involved. In the Eastern Nile sub-basin, ENTRO is at a critical juncture. The current crisis arisen around the Cooperative Framework Agreement and the Grand Renaissance Dam can be seen not only as a risk, but also as an opportunity to re-think about the foundations for win-win cooperation in the Eastern Nile sub-basin. ENTRO has demonstrated the value added of transboundary cooperation and set in place a number of institutional building blocks. It has laid the foundations for cooperative data, information, and knowledge management and exchange. It has embarked on joint investment planning and promotion with the willingness to deliver tangible results for the benefit of the basin people. What it needs now is a strong engine, fuel, a clear direction set by the governments, and the green light to move ahead. Thank you.
- "Why would governments want to cooperate for the management of international rivers. What are the benefits - what are the risks?"
- "Why would governments want Transboundary River Basin Institutions and how to build them successful? "
But first allow me to briefly set the scene of the macro-economic context. Macro-economic context Since I was born, the world population has almost tripled. In the next 30 years, the African population will still double. In the developing world, poverty alleviation and economic growth will remain the top priorities for decades. The needs for development are gigantic and the challenges are monumental. In Africa, in the next 30 years, the need for energy will grow by a factor of 4 or 5, The investment needs in the hydropower sector alone in Africa is estimated at $US 20 to 25 billion/year. Food requirements will more than double, while renewable water resources per capita will be reduced by half. More countries will face severe water scarcity and will not be able to achieve food self-sufficiency. Countries will thus have to rely more and more on food trade as well as on significant increase of productivity of rain fed agriculture. And while Africa has the lowest water storage capacity per capita, the risks of severe droughts and floods will dramatically increase if global warming continues. Fortunately, huge potentials are still untapped. But with increased pressure on the resources, environmental protection will also become more and more important in the political agendas. In Africa less than 10% of the hydropower potential is exploited. Tens of millions of hectares of land can still be put under irrigation in the basins where the natural flow of the river is not yet intensively used, such as the Congo and the Zambezi, but which is unfortunately not the case any more for the Nile. Emerging economical giants are changing the global economical and geopolitical landscape. Besides these giants, each individual country alone represents less and less on the world chessboard. The globalisation of the economy increases competition but offers also new opportunities for those who stick together with their neighbors. To create alliances, to develop joint ventures, to develop commercial exchanges, to increase mobility of people and goods, and to optimize the development and management of their natural resources. There is an increasing need of pooling resources together and of reducing political risks in order to attract international investment in financing large-scale infrastructure with a regional dimension. Countries have no other choice any more than to develop regional economic cooperation and integration.. The picture of international development aid is also changing drastically. In the last 10 years, new players have appeared on the stage. China alone contributed more to hydropower development in Africa than the total aid provided by all conventional multilateral organizations. Need for cooperation on the management of international rivers This quick review of the global and African macro-economic context brings me to the first question: "Why would governments want to cooperate on the management of international rivers. What are the benefits - what are the risks?" I will never forget the comment of the Council Chairman of the Mekong River Commission in the beginning of my mandate in 2004. He said to me, as a friendly provocation: "Olivier, why do we need to cooperate if there is nothing to cooperate on?". Let me try to give some answers to this simple but challenging question. First of all, it's obvious that the sustainable exploitation of the water resources potential of a large river system, for energy, food, transport, tourism, may contribute substantially to socio-economic development and increase of GDP. But in Africa, a reality is that 80 % of the water resources are "transboundary" in nature, which means that they are shared by at least two countries. And there is also a physical reality that cannot be ignored: because of topography and climate, hydropower generation is often more profitable when developed upstream, in cascades of hydropower dams where water can be re-used several times before being evaporated downstream in irrigation schemes. Integrated planning of irrigation and hydropower developments at the basin or sub basin scale is thus obviously more optimal and more cost-effective. And in a later stage, when tens of large multi-purpose dams and water diversions are in operation in one river system, uncoordinated operations can only lead to catastrophes and to poor economical efficiencies. That's how big countries such as China, the USA, Brazil, India, Australia, try to optimize their investments and operations at the basin scale. But in transboundary river basins, such optimal planning of investments and operations cannot be achieved without strong inter-governmental cooperation based on appropriate agreements. So, the need for joint investment planning in a first stage, and for joint operation of multiple hydraulic structures in a later stage, may generate much more economical return than individual planning and operation. The difference may count in hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars per year. In Africa, there are still opportunities to jointly build dams on rivers which constitute the border between two countries. And for business purposes alone, there are also opportunities for creating joint ventures between neighbouring countries for the building and the operation of dams in one of the countries. In the Mekong Basin, Thai public companies are investing in hydropower development in Laos, with the aim of selling electricity to Thailand. And Vietnam has plans to build hydropower dams in Cambodia. Besides hydropower, there are also several other specific issues, which obviously can be better addressed in cooperation with the neighbours. I already mentioned that food security in Africa will rely more and more on food trade. Reducing flood risks needs early warning systems and flood protection measures which can only be designed and implemented across borders. Cross-border navigation is another relevant case. On the Mekong River, it's the Mekong River Commission who installed the light buoys and who facilitated the negotiations to allow night navigation between Vietnam and Cambodia. Managing the risks of large pollutions due to industrial or shipping accidents on a shared river is one more concrete example. Supporting upstream countries to fight against soil erosion to reduce siltation and to reduce the costs of canal cleaning in downstream countries is another example. This is known as the concept of "payment for watershed services". So there are plenty of excellent reasons to develop cooperation between countries sharing a common river. Now what about the risk of non- cooperation, of continuing "business as usual"? In the context of growing needs for resources, lack of cooperation among riparian countries sharing an international river may lead to grave political crises. This is not just a speculation. Such crises exist: there are several examples of dramatic floods caused in downstream countries by uncoordinated dam releases in upstream countries. In 2004, I have been invited by the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Thai parliament in Bangkok to appease an political tension between Thailand and China. Thai farmers were urging the Thai Government to send a complain to the Chinese Government about impacts of the cascade of dams in China. One was talking about the "Mekong Crisis". Seen the macro-economic context, it makes no doubt to me that without constructive cooperation to address concrete water related issues, the economic, environmental, and thus political risks can only increase dramatically and very quickly. In the case of the Nile, a river under such an huge and increasing stress, uncoordinated investments may only lead to a political "crash". Cooperation mechanisms do not cost a lot, but non-cooperation may lead to mistrust, to severe conflicts, to losses of billions of dollars, to obstacles to trade, and to losses of human lives. How to build successful transboundary river basin institutions So, let us assume that governments may well be convinced by the need for cooperation on the management of transboundary rivers. But that doesn't mean that they are motivated to create and financially support substantially the development and operation of River Basin and Sub-basin organizations. Regional institutions are rarely the "cherished child" of governments. Look at the difficulties encountered in Europe in convincing the population about the usefulness and efficiency of the European institutions and treaties. The question is not so much 'Why " to cooperate, but the question is more "What for" and "How". What should be the role and mandate of a River Basin Organization (RBO)? What should be the scope and content of an international agreement to regulate, govern or facilitate cooperative transboundary river basin management. Let's make a brief diagnosis and look at the difficulties without beating the bush, or "sans langue de bois" as one says in French. Let's face it frankly: all around the world, I can find governments who are disappointed by the orientations and the performances of their basin organizations and who are therefore reluctant to increase their financial contribution. Governments sometimes look at RBOs rather weirdly and express their impatience to see more concrete and tangible on-the-ground investments, which would be able to boost regional cooperation and economic development. I often hear the following complains in the mouth of top-politicians: "lack of tangible outputs for the direct benefit of the people, endless processes, too much paper and too many strategies, lack of visibility, too much donor-driveness, too much emphasis on environment, too much dispersion., lack of clarity, lack of focus". Too many actors also want to influence the directions and priorities of transboundary cooperative organizations. And when we look at the motivations of a large part of the donor community, joint investment planning is often drowned in a pond of many other functions and concepts. With such an approach, the risk exist that RBOs get stuck in an endless process of capacity building, data collection, knowledge generation, environmental assessment, awareness building, gender mainstreaming, stakeholder involvement, climate change adaptation, etc. before focusing their efforts on the preparation and implementation of a concrete joint investment program. And we may like it or not, but with exaggerated emphasis put on the environmental aspects, governments will more and more, and individually, turn their eyes to the new players in the game: China, India, Brazil, Korea. In my views, the main problem of many basin organizations is that their mandate is too broad and nebulous, not enough concentrated on tangible outputs with immediate and tangible benefits for the basin populations. RBOs tend to get trapped in a vicious circle. The delays in delivering tangible results generate impatience and lack of confidence from their governments, reducing their motivation for more financial support, and thus delaying the process even more. This was the message given to me by the governments of the 4 member countries of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) when I entered in office in 2004. We thus tried together to rectify the policy orientation and strategic direction of the organization. But we immediately faced a very negative reaction of an important part of the donor community. The Mekong governments wanted the organization to be a facilitator of joint investments, while the key donors wanted the MRC to remain only a knowledge broker, with strong emphasis on environmental impacts of national investments. During the council meeting in December 2005 a crisis broke out between the member countries on the one hand and the donor community on the other, led by the Denmark. The donors made the following statement: “Donors are concerned about the direction towards increased emphasis on MRC becoming an organization that drives investments. In our view the MRC should maintain and strengthen its unique role as a knowledge based river basin organization ....... the investment facilitation role should be limited to screening of projects based on MRC's knowledge and expertise and not undertake pre-feasibility studies.…”. This directive statement was signed by 19 donors. The country delegations reacted heavily during the meeting. One of the country representatives stood up and said: "We don't want the MRC to be NATO, No Action, Talk Only". But at the end, nothing fundamentally changed, as donors, pulling the purse strings, still pay 85 % of MRC's budget. The preparation of a joint investment program is still considered only as one of the medium and long-term options. This has also negative consequences on the cooperation with China, which is not yet a member of the MRC. In June 2005, I was officially invited by China to talk about opportunities for increased cooperation. It appeared that China was open to participate in a joint investment program, but that the main obstacle was the donor-driven nature and lack of country ownership of the institution. Still today, China prefers to cooperate through bilateral arrangements and through more economically driven inter-governmental cooperation frameworks in the Mekong region. Suggested approach What could be a more effective approach and what are the traps to avoid in order to build successful Transboundary River Basin Institutions? To address this I would need more time, but at least I can try to draw some lessons from my own experience and suggest a possible approach on the basis of some key principles. But as there is no standard model for transboundary river basin institutions, the ideas presented here should be nuanced and adapted to the historical, geopolitical, economical, geographical, and hydrological specificities of each river basin. The first principle is that the institution must be "country-owned" and "country-driven". Country-ownership of the strategy and of the management of the institution is fundamental. But country-ownership can only exist if governments are convinced by the its strategic orientation and efficiency. We will come back to the mission later on. A second principle is that the approach has to continuously remain "issue-based". As discussed before, the range of issues and challenges in a basin is very broad. Too broad for a small institution. One say in French: "qui trop embrasse, mal etreint", which can somehow be translated in English by: 'grasp all, lose all.' In other words, one should limit the scope to those cooperation areas which obviously need a basin or sub-basin approach and for which governments are strongly convinced that cooperation may offer substantial benefits and reduce risks. A third principle is that the cooperation must remain "objective oriented". The objective should be to deliver concrete, tangible, and visible results within a reasonable timeframe. To help the member countries to go in a clear direction and to reach a given point in a given time. The direction, the role, the purpose, the "core business", of a Transboundary River Basin Institution must be clear, simply stated, convincing and straightforward. It has to be understood by everyone, and above all by the media and the population. In the developed world, the main objective may be environmental protection. This is understandable. But in most large rivers in the developing world, the driving force of cooperation will remain for many years the need for more optimal, more productive, more profitable, more cost-effective and sustainable coordinated investment to harness the water resources of a river, to increase the water, food, and energy security and to protect the people. With such a purpose - clearly stated - a transboundary river basin institution should have the ambition to be a leader in sustainable economic development in its region. Therefore one needs of course data, information, knowledge, models, monitoring systems, planning capacity, public participation, and more. But all this should not be seen as a purpose in itself. These are only useful means to reach an objective, not an objective in itself. A car may have a nice body, a strong frame, comfortable seats, good tires, but without an engine it will not go very far. In the late fifties the clearly stated objective of jointly building and operating the Kariba dam, one of the largest dams in the world, has laid the foundation of the creation of the Zambezi River Authority between Zambia and Zimbabwe. More recently, after the colonial times, it has been the willingness to build and operate jointly the Manantali and the Diama dam on the Senegal River, which has laid the foundation of the cooperation agreement between the 4 riparian countries and the basis of the creation of the "OMVS". Look at the clear Vision of the Zambezi River Authority: "To be the premier organ for harnessing and managing the Zambezi waters for economic and social development". And to its mission: "satisfying all our stakeholders through purposefully and sustainably exploiting the natural advantages offered by the Zambezi River" Facilitating joint investment should be clearly seen from outside as being the motor of the car, not only one of the passengers. Another principle is that the organization needs to have one clear, well-structured, and coherent program, to implement one clear "country-owned" strategy to reach the objective. To prepare and facilitate the negotiation and then the implementation of such a joint investment program we need a strong institution. That becomes its "reason to be". I use here the term "investment program" in its broad sense: it should be a well-balanced combination of hard and soft investments, including environment protection measures, providing benefits for all member states. An example is the investment program signed in 2008 by the 9 Heads of States of the Niger Basin Authority. As said before already, I have seen too many cases where an RBO implements a poorly structured and nebulous mix of overlapping programs and projects. Haziness, nebulousness in defining the organization and its activities is a killing factor. The rule should be: "one organization, one objective, one strategy and one program to reach the common objective". Another important principle is the principle of subsidiarity. Whatever countries can do, let it be done by them. And let the capacity be built first at country level before being built at regional level. In the field of data collection, knowledge generation, and research, the role of an RBO should be limited to harmonization, coordination, and synthesizing. Another principle is the adoption of a stepwise and flexible approach. Sometimes agreements should not be too complex and constraining before engaging in concrete cooperation. The Mekong Agreement signed in 1995 is rather general and not very binding. Over the years, MRC facilitated the negotiation of more precise rules and procedures for which an agreement could not be found in 1995. At that time, it was for example not possible to agree on precise rules for the maintenance of flows on the river mainstream. Procedures have only been approved 11 years later and concrete figures for acceptable flows to be maintained at specific locations are yet to be defined and agreed upon. Sometimes it may also be more convenient to start the cooperation with only one joint investment project or set of projects, and to build a common institution for that purpose only. In the case of the building of a large dam in an upstream country, which is often controversial, win-win cooperation with downstream countries for the financing, the construction and the operation of the dam may considerable reduce the risks as well as generate substantial benefits for all. Rather to become a source of tension, it may become an opportunity for focused and constructive cooperation. And when more trust is there, when the institution has proven it's efficiency and effectiveness, the cooperation may be further extended and enriched to address jointly other investment opportunities and development challenges. Conclusion Without strong win-win cooperation for optimal use and management of shared water resources, the world in general and Africa in particular, will face highly unefficient water use and increasing risks of competition and conflicts. The management of any large international river system needs a well-balanced but focused cooperation, based on shared investments and shared benefits, recognizing the complementarities and priority needs of all the parties involved. In the Eastern Nile sub-basin, ENTRO is at a critical juncture. The current crisis arisen around the Cooperative Framework Agreement and the Grand Renaissance Dam can be seen not only as a risk, but also as an opportunity to re-think about the foundations for win-win cooperation in the Eastern Nile sub-basin. ENTRO has demonstrated the value added of transboundary cooperation and set in place a number of institutional building blocks. It has laid the foundations for cooperative data, information, and knowledge management and exchange. It has embarked on joint investment planning and promotion with the willingness to deliver tangible results for the benefit of the basin people. What it needs now is a strong engine, fuel, a clear direction set by the governments, and the green light to move ahead. Thank you.
The Geopolitical Impact of the Nile
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